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Intergroup prejudice is both complex and multifaceted. 
Since the 1950s, psychologists have examined the psy-
chological and personal bases of prejudice and ethno-
centrism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954). Sixty years of empirical 
research has convincingly illustrated that individuals 
expressing higher (vs. lower) prejudice are less agreeable 
and less open to new ideas and experiences (Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008), exhibit stronger needs for simplicity and 
order (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and demonstrate more 
anxious reactivity to out-group members (Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006). These accounts converge with earlier 
theorizing (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954) that tough-
mindedness and cognitive rigidity influence whether 
social environments are considered threatening and char-
acterize prejudiced individuals. Notably, these constructs 
involve personality traits, preferences for dealing with 
information, and manifestations of emotional reactivity, 
which in turn drive feelings of uncertainty, fear, and resis-
tance toward unfamiliar and unknown groups (Dhont, 
Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).
But what about mental abilities, the psychological 
resources needed to process and retain knowledge, 
solve problems, and master challenging tasks? Theoretical 
pioneers tentatively posited that prejudice and ethnocen-
trism may originate in lower mental abilities. For instance, 
Adorno et al. (1950) observed that “the most ethnocentric 
subjects are, on the average, less intelligent than the least 
ethnocentric” (p. 284). At that time, however, few studies 
addressed associations between mental ability and preju-
dice, and potential confounds limited firm conclusions. 
Consequently, consideration of mental abilities is notice-
ably absent from contemporary accounts of prejudice, 
with the field sidestepping this socially sensitive issue 
(Hodson, 2014). Yet methodological and statistical 
advances now permit a return to this lingering question: 
Does low cognitive ability predict greater prejudice?
Empirical Evidence on the Relation 
Between Mental Abilities and Prejudice
Early empirical evidence (Adorno et al., 1950) revealed 
negative relations between scores on ethnocentrism 
549750 CDPXXX10.1177/0963721414549750Dhont, HodsonCognitive Ability and Prejudice
research-article2014
Corresponding Author:
Kristof Dhont, School of Psychology, Keynes College, University of 
Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NP, United Kingdom 
E-mail: k.dhont@kent.ac.uk
Does Lower Cognitive Ability Predict 
Greater Prejudice?
Kristof Dhont1,2 and Gordon Hodson3
1Department of Developmental, Personality and Social Psychology, Ghent University; 2School of Psychology, 
University of Kent; and 3Department of Psychology, Brock University
Abstract
Historically, leading scholars proposed a theoretical negative association between cognitive abilities and prejudice. 
Until recently, however, the field has been relatively silent on this topic, citing concerns with potential confounds 
(e.g., education levels). Instead, researchers focused on other individual-difference predictors of prejudice, including 
cognitive style, personality, negativity bias, and threat. Yet there exists a solid empirical paper trail demonstrating that 
lower cognitive abilities (e.g., abstract-reasoning skills and verbal, nonverbal, and general intelligence) predict greater 
prejudice. We discuss how the effects of lower cognitive ability on prejudice are explained (i.e., mediated) by greater 
endorsement of right-wing socially conservative attitudes. We conclude that the field will benefit from a recognition 
of, and open discussion about, differences in cognitive abilities between those lower versus higher in prejudice. To 
advance the scientific discussion, we propose the Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation model, which outlines the 
cognitive psychological underpinnings of ideological belief systems and prejudice.
Keywords
cognitive abilities, prejudice, intelligence, intolerance, ideology
 at Templeman Lib/The Librarian on December 17, 2014cdp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Cognitive Ability and Prejudice 455
(tapping blatant prejudice toward different minority 
groups) and mental abilities, across various adult samples 
(including maritime-school students and veterans). These 
relations were observed using various intelligence tests, 
including reading, mechanical-comprehension, and 
general- intelligence tests. Other researchers, using similar 
ethnocentrism scales, confirmed such relations among 
students (Rokeach, 1951) and young children (Kutner & 
Gordon, 1964). Furthermore, Kutner and Gordon (1964) 
reported that children who were highly prejudiced at age 
7 remained more prejudiced 9 years later, scoring lower 
on intelligence at both time points.
Early scholars were, however, concerned about possi-
ble confounds such as socioeconomic status (SES) and 
educational experiences (Adorno et  al., 1950; Allport, 
1954; Christie, 1954). For instance, those with stronger 
cognitive abilities may hold more tolerant attitudes 
toward out-groups because of higher educational attain-
ment or greater cross-cultural exposure in family and 
school contexts, factors associated with higher SES. Thus, 
increased cultural sophistication and greater educational 
experience, rather than mental abilities per se, could 
explain why those with stronger cognitive skills are gen-
erally less prejudiced (e.g., Allport, 1954; Christie, 1954).
Historically, these factors were not convincingly elimi-
nated, with scholars conceptually and theoretically de-
emphasizing mental abilities in prejudice theories in the 
decades following the 1950s. Nevertheless, empirical evi-
dence kept accruing, consistently revealing negative 
associations of mental abilities, such as verbal and math-
ematical abilities, with ethnocentrism or prejudice (e.g., 
racial prejudice: Meeusen, de Vroome, & Hooghe, 2013; 
Sidanius & Lau, 1989; homophobia: Keiller, 2010). For 
example, Costello and Hodson (2014) demonstrated that 
White children who were less able to recognize that a 
short, wide glass holds the same amount of water as a 
taller, thinner glass in a water-conservation task, or that 
objects from different categories (cars, trucks) belong to 
a shared superordinate category (vehicles), expressed 
more negative evaluations of Black children and attrib-
uted fewer uniquely human characteristics to Black peo-
ple. Hence, cognitive ability also shows negative relations 
with measures representing rather indirect forms of bias 
and discrimination (e.g., subtle dehumanization), which 
are generally less likely to be affected by social- desirability 
tendencies (see Eyssel & Ribas, 2012).
Critically, Van Hiel, Onraet, and De Pauw (2010) con-
ducted a meta-analytic review and statistically aggregated 
the findings from 92 studies (29,209 participants from 124 
samples) reporting relations between cognitive styles and 
abilities, on the one hand, and social-cultural ideological 
attitudes, such as authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, on 
the other. In a subset of participants (1,409 participants 
from 12 samples) for whom data on indicators 
of cognitive ability and measures of ethnocentrism or 
prejudice were available, the authors uncovered a nega-
tive correlation (−.30).
Three important shortcomings inherent to most of the 
studies reviewed above require discussion. First, most 
used cross-sectional data and cannot address whether 
lower cognitive abilities influence the subsequent devel-
opment of negative out-group attitudes. Second, few 
examined population-representative samples. Third, most 
failed to remove SES or education confounds. Two recent 
studies compellingly addressed these issues. Deary, Batty, 
and Gale (2008a) and Schoon, Cheng, Gale, Batty, and 
Deary (2010) investigated the prospective association 
between general intelligence in childhood (ages 10 and 
11, respectively) and a combined social-attitude measure 
of racism, social conservatism, and gender inequality in 
adulthood (ages 30 and 33, respectively), using large rep-
resentative U.K. samples. Their results confirmed that 
children higher in mental ability were less likely to 
endorse socially conservative ideologies in adulthood. A 
reanalysis by Hodson and Busseri (2012) tested the effect 
of intelligence specifically on racial prejudice and found 
that greater general intelligence in childhood predicted 
less racism in adulthood (average correlation approxi-
mately −.22). Although cognitive ability conceptually and 
statistically predicts lower SES and education (Deary 
et al., 2008a; Schoon et al., 2010), direct predictive effects 
of cognitive ability on social attitudes remain after con-
trolling for SES, education, and social background (see 
also Hodson & Busseri, 2012), ruling out these potential 
confounds.
Our review suggests an affirmative answer to the ques-
tion “Does lower cognitive ability predict greater preju-
dice?” This negative association has been found 
cross-sectionally, with various intelligence measures 
across different age groups, and longitudinally, with rep-
resentative samples. Furthermore, cognitive ability exerts 
an effect on prejudice independently of SES and educa-
tion. But why does lower mental ability predict greater 
prejudice?
The Explanatory Role of Right-Wing 
Socially Conservative Ideologies
Right-wing ideologies offer well-structured and ordered 
views about society that preserve traditional societal con-
ventions and norms (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003). Such ideological belief systems are par-
ticularly attractive to individuals who are strongly moti-
vated to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity in preference 
for simplicity and predictability ( Jost et al., 2003; Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2011). Theoretically, individuals with lower 
mental abilities should be attracted by right-wing social-
cultural ideologies because they minimize complexity 
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and increase perceived control (Heaven, Ciarrochi, & 
Leeson, 2011; Stankov, 2009). Conversely, individuals 
with greater cognitive skills are better positioned to 
understand changing and dynamic societal contexts, 
which should facilitate open-minded, relatively left- 
leaning attitudes (Deary et al., 2008a; Heaven et al., 2011; 
McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999). 
Lower cognitive abilities therefore draw people to strate-
gies and ideologies that emphasize what is presently 
known and considered acceptable to make sense and 
impose order over their environment. Resistance to social 
change and the preservation of the status quo regarding 
societal traditions—key principles underpinning right-
wing social-cultural ideologies—should be particularly 
appealing to those wishing to avoid uncertainty and 
threat.
Indeed, the empirical literature reveals negative rela-
tions between cognitive abilities and right-wing social-
cultural attitudes, including right-wing authoritarian (e.g., 
Keiller, 2010; McCourt et al., 1999), socially conservative 
(e.g., Stankov, 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2010), and religious 
attitudes (e.g., Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013). 
Although some studies have found that people on both 
the far left and the far right ends of the political spectrum 
possess greater cognitive abilities or sophistication 
(Kemmelmeier, 2008; Sidanius & Lau, 1989), evidence for 
such curvilinear relations have typically been found 
when (a) cognitive-ability measures were themselves 
political in nature or (b) researchers have measured par-
ticipants’ motivation to maintain a viewpoint with dog-
matic tenacity (vs. developing multidimensional views), 
which taps motivated cognitive styles but not ability (e.g., 
Sidanius & Lau, 1989; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003).
Importantly, linear relations of the sort we emphasize, 
in which lower scores on cognitive ability and complex-
ity are associated with right-leaning ideologies, persist 
despite potential curvilinear trends (Kemmelmeier, 2008; 
Van Hiel et al., 2010). Furthermore, Eidelman, Crandall, 
Goodman, and Blanchar (2012) have provided experi-
mental support that low-effort thinking promotes politi-
cal conservatism. Linear relations have also been 
confirmed longitudinally, with poorer mental abilities in 
childhood predicting stronger endorsement of right-wing 
authoritarianism and social conservatism (e.g., Deary 
et  al., 2008a; Heaven et  al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 
2012; Schoon et al., 2010) and right-leaning voting behav-
ior (Deary, Batty, & Gale, 2008b) in adulthood. Together, 
the findings from these studies demonstrate that those 
with lower mental abilities are more likely to endorse 
socially conservative, right-wing authoritarian, and reli-
gious belief systems (Deary et al., 2008a; McCourt et al., 
1999), as has been confirmed in meta-analytic syntheses 
(Van Hiel et al., 2010; Zuckerman et al., 2013).
Particularly relevant to our discussion, socially conser-
vative ideologies are well-established predictors of eth-
nocentrism and prejudice against minority, disadvantaged, 
or socially deviant groups (e.g., Everett, 2013; see meta-
analyses by Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Sibley & Duckitt, 
2008). Indeed, adherents of socially conservative ideolo-
gies are more likely to perceive out-groups as threats to 
traditional values and societal order, which results in 
heightened prejudice (e.g., Dhont & Hodson, 2014; 
Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009). Longitudinal studies, 
using both student and representative adult samples, 
have confirmed that right-wing attitudes significantly pre-
dict increased prejudice over time (Asbrock, Christ, 
Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012; Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010).
Given the established relations between lower mental 
ability and adherence to socially conservative right-wing 
ideologies and between right-wing ideologies and preju-
dice, it is conceivable that mental abilities predict preju-
dice through socially conservative right-wing ideologies 
(see Fig. 1). Hodson and Busseri (2012) explicitly tested 
this mediation model, and their results confirmed that 
lower childhood intelligence predicted greater prejudice 
in adulthood through stronger endorsement of right-
wing social-cultural attitudes (independent of SES or 
education).
In sum, meaningful differences in mental abilities exist 
between those lower versus higher in right-wing social 
conservatism and prejudice, despite being absent from 
contemporary theoretical accounts of prejudice (Hodson, 
2014). In response, we propose a conceptual framework, 










Fig. 1. Mediation model showing the relation between cognitive ability and prejudice as mediated by 
right-wing ideologies (see Hodson & Busseri, 2012). The dashed line reflects a weakened relation with 
the mediator included.
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model, which integrates empirical and theoretical litera-
tures to advance our collective discussion of, and inspire 
future research on, the cognitive psychological underpin-
nings of ideological belief systems and prejudice.
An Integrative Model of Cognitive 
Ability and Style to Evaluation
Building on Hodson (2014), we propose the CASE model 
to explain the theoretical relations between cognitive 
abilities and styles on the one hand and intergroup out-
comes (e.g., stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination) on 
the other (see Fig. 2). It is worth bearing in mind that the 
causes of prejudice are multifaceted, with cultural and 
societal factors impinging on expressions of bias in ways 
that lie outside the scope of our review. Here, we focus 
on the predictive role of cognitive abilities or cognitive 
styles, arguing that these cognitive predictors are rela-
tively distal to intergroup outcomes and that their effects 
are thus indirect.
In the first stage, cognitive variables directly influ-
ence assessments of threat concerning the social and/or 
physical world. Thus, possessing lower cognitive abili-
ties and having preferences for simple structure, order, 
and predictability predispose individuals to perceive 
changing and dynamic contexts as especially threaten-
ing. The immediate response to this threat involves pre-
vention (vs. promotion) reactions that emphasize what 
is already known and familiar (i.e., the status quo), in 
the interest of reducing uncertainty and anxiety and 
minimizing potential harm or danger. As such, preven-
tion responses and “conservative” reactions are both 
basic and normal (Eidelman et al., 2012), triggered by 
an oversensitivity to the unfamiliar (or to perceived 
threats) but also representing a reasonable response 
based on a critical evaluation of threatening environ-
mental factors.
Over time, this prevention focus fuels more stable 
forms of prevention-focused orientations toward the 
social world ( Janoff-Bulman, 2009), such as socially con-
servative and religious belief systems that emphasize 
resistance to change and protection of the status quo (see 
Jost et al., 2003). Indeed, when threatened, people gener-
ally shift to the ideological right (Hetherington & Suhay, 
2011; Onraet, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014), which in turn 
increases stereotypical thinking (Castelli & Carraro, 2011), 
prejudicial attitudes (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), discrimina-
tion (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and out-group avoidance 
(Hodson, 2011).
Importantly, endorsing socially conservative ideolo-
gies will also generally feed back into stronger threat 
perceptions, motivating interpretations of the social 
world as threatening, which further confirms and justifies 
conservative beliefs (e.g., Onraet et  al., 2014). 
Furthermore, perceived threat from specific out-groups 
can also directly enhance negative outcomes toward 
those out-groups (Riek et al., 2006), which in turn may 
promote right-wing political beliefs consistent with a 
 prevention-protection focus against out-group threat. 
Threat perceptions, right-wing socially conservative atti-
tudes, and negative attitudes toward out-groups may thus 
mutually reinforce each other. Overall, the CASE model 
provides a framework that integrates related but distinct 
literatures in a meaningful way, proposing mechanisms 
through which cognitive variables (e.g., ability and style) 
can impact more distal outcomes (e.g., intergroup rela-
tions) through threat perceptions and prevention- oriented 
responses.
Current and Future Directions
Our review highlights limitations warranting further 
inquiry. First, the studies reviewed have overwhelmingly 





















IMMEDIATE RESPONSE STABLE BELIEF SYSTEMS
Intergroup Outcomes
Psychological Process Mechanisms
Fig. 2. The Cognitive Ability and Style to Evaluation model of the effects of cognitive ability and style on intergroup outcomes via psychological 
processes, controlling for factors such as education and socioeconomic status.
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with stronger cognitive skills might be better at masking 
socially unacceptable attitudes, responses to straightfor-
ward questions about out-group attitudes are unlikely to 
require elaborate cognitive skills of the sort that differen-
tiate those with lower versus higher mental abilities (for 
a discussion, see Hodson & Busseri, 2012). Furthermore, 
negative relations between mental abilities and prejudice 
also occur among university students (e.g., Keiller, 2010) 
and young children (e.g., Costello & Hodson, 2014), and 
occur independently of education, rendering this account 
unlikely. However, in more complex or nuanced contexts 
(e.g., job-hiring decisions about candidates with ambigu-
ous qualifications), those lower in cognitive ability may 
be less able to inhibit biases, failing to recognize and 
execute socially appropriate responses. We therefore 
urgently encourage the future use of nonreactive and 
implicit measures of prejudice.
Second, extant research has examined only Westerners, 
limiting the generalizability of its findings to other socio-
political contexts. Psychological characteristics typically 
associated with right-wing socially conservative ideolo-
gies are also likely manifest among defenders of the sta-
tus quo in totalitarian communist regimes. More research 
is needed to advance our understanding of social con-
servatism in non-Western societies and its relations with 
cognitive ability, resistance to change, and out-group 
attitudes. Finally, associations between cognitive abilities 
and ideological attitudes in the economic-hierarchical 
domain remain underinvestigated. Theoretically, eco-
nomic (vs. social) conservatism represents an unlikely 
mediator (Heaven et al., 2011), but this remains untested. 
In closing, we want to be clear that this review does not 
inform the rationality, accuracy, or validity of right- or 
left-wing ideologies, but rather helps to illuminate cogni-
tive factors contributing to ideological and intergroup 
attitudes.
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